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BOMBER

OFFENSIVE

An article by

Air Commodore L. MacLean

*

*

*

Smooth the descent and easy is the way:
The gates of hell stand open night and day
But to return, and view the cheerful skies,
In this the task and mighty labour lies.

*

*

*

-Dryden

"You can stand in any one of a thousand places in the

larger cities of Germany and as far as the eye can see there is
nothing but ruin. Many of · those areas will not be rebuilt for

generations-if they are rebuilt at all." Those are the opening
words of an article entitled "Thoughts on the Devastation of the
German Cities," by Leo A. Codd, Editor of the American maga
zine Ordnance. H<:\ continues: "Words and photographs are in
adequate to describe the degree of damage that has been done to
European culture in all the countries where total war from the air

was waged."

From the spiritual he descends to the material and quotes
statistics: "To appraise the cost to ourselves in material and in effort ponder these figures: there were more than 1,440,000 bomber

sorties and 2,680,000 fighter sorties flown against the enemy. The

cost in dollars to the United States for its part in the Air War in
Europe was more than $43,000,000,000." His figures are taken from
the United States Strategic Bombing Survey and are therefore au
thoritative.
This article is reprinted from the British Magazine, "Fighting Forces."
The opinions expressed are those of the author. Its publication here
in reflects neither the approval nor disapproval of the U. S. Navy or
the Naval War College. It is presented merely to acquaint officers with
one point of view.
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The cost of the British share, extending as it did over a much
longer period, cannot have been less. We thus reach a combined
total, expressed in sterling, for the whole air war in Europe, of the
order of 21,000,000,000 pounds, a figure at which comprehension
boggles. It would be well indeed to ponder on the return for this
prodigious outlay since the success or failure of a war, like any
other form of the business of life, can only be judged on the basis
of results accruing in relation to energy· expended. Materially this
country is now bankrupt. Spiritually-"What shall it profit a man
if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?"
War is essentially an affair of ethics as well as , economics
and, though the economical aspect presses heavily on the people of
the world today, the ethical aspect has continuously occupied the
thoughts of mankind in an unceasing endeavour to diminish war's
inevitable horrors, and to limit and localize its effects. The advocates
of "air power", in urging their claim for precedence, took a firm
stand, with a foot planted squarely on each of these bases. In
comparison with war waged by military or sea power, air warfare,
they maintained, would prove not only more humane but incom
parably cheaper. Humane, they argued, because aerial bombard
ment would not be directed towards the wholesale destruction of
humanity, but focussed on those few centres vital to national life,
would, through a dislocation of governmental control and the
routine of living, undermine public morale, destroy the will to
fight and cause a collapse at the centre regardless of the outcome
of naval or military action. Cheaper-because cheapness is, of
course, inherent in a short war waged by a small air force whose
attacks would be so precisely focussed.
Such was the Air Staff's gospel of war, propagated as
siduously throughout some twenty years from 1919 onwards; and
the people of this country began ·the war deluded into the belief that
it was well founded · and practicable. About this let there be no
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mistake or evasive thinking. The simple summary above is the es

sence and substance of what was'fed to the public and is essentially
and substantially what the man in the street believes today. The
protagonists of this gospel were acclaimed, not because of their

powers of logical deduction from past events but because, pre
sumably by divine inspiration, they could, despite the lessons from
-those events, prophesy a new era.
By 1925 the separatist Air Staff doctrine, purely conjec
tural, had been crystaUized and was officially enunciated by the
Commandant of the R. A. F. Staff College as follows:

"If the Government had decided that the main ef

fort towards winning the war was to be made by its air
power, the object of the Air Force will be to dislocate

the national life of the enemy people: and the vital cen

tres would then be-:-the seat of government, transport
and communication systems and the water, light and food

, supply."

That the Government did decide, at an early date in hos
tilities, that the main effort towards winning the war was to be

made by air power, is easily ascertained by reference to the utter
ances of such public authorities as Mr. Churchill and Sir Arthur

Harris. Sir Arthur Harris-a Marshall of the Royal Air Force-

in his book "Bomber Offensive" writes on page 53:

"It is worth while remarking that no other
country in the world had at that time* conceived the pos
sibility of using an air force in this way to fight a war
by itself and, within certain limits, win a war outright."
On page 54:
"Winning a war by bombing as at that time** we

were proposing to do."

* 1940
** 1941
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And, finally on page 76:
The general idea at this time*** on what civil
serv�nts always call a high level, was that the main and
almost the only purpose of bombing was to attack the
morale of the industrial workers."
Similarly, Mr. Churchill, in a number of speeches, left little
doubt on the point, but in particular, in an address to Congress
in Washington on 19th May, 1943, he said:
"Opinion, Mr. President, is divided as to whether
th� use of air power by itself will bring about a collapse
of Germany or Italy. The experiment is well worth trying."
It is unnecessary further to labour the point. We have from
these two supreme authorities that it was the policy of the Govern
ment, accepted by the Air Staff, that the Air Force should at
tempt the task of fighting and winning a war by an unprecedented
process emploring an entirely new technique---the process of strik
ing direct at the vital centres in the enemy's economy, using a
technique of selective obliteration by means of bombs from the air,
to bring about a collapse of public morale and the surrender of the
enemy government through popular pressure.
Since the collapse of neither Italy nor Germany did oc
cur until, in the first case American and British armies had over
run the country, and in the second American, British and Russian
armies had, foot by foot, fought their way to a convergence from
all sides on to Germany's capital with her armies hemmed in and
immovable, it is unnecessary to labour the failure of this air
power experiment--the most costly in history.

�I

••• 1942
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Despite this failure, the old soothsayers-unabashed, un

ashamed and active-are still making the same prophecies and the
bomber doctrine is still booming.

It is therefore more than ever

necessary to extricate from the morass of propaganda the few
pieces of substance and truth.

�

In previous articles I have indicated the oblique conse-

quences, on naval and military operations, of the separatist doc
trine.

In this article I intend to trace the course of the central

bomber offensive, not with a view to emphasizing its self-evident

failure but in order to reach some estimate Qf how much or how
little it contributed towards, or even retarded, victory.

The indispensable foundation, to bring the experiment even

into the realms of feasibility, is the ability on the part of the
bombing force to hit. a preselected target of known importance in

the enemy's economic system. The questions demanding an answer
are: Did the bomber force in fact possess the required skill?

If

not, to what extent was this skill lacking and were the Air Staff

. aware of its absence before war began?

The first lesson, learned at a desperate price, was that day

light bombing was out of the question.

Both Lord Tedder and

Sir Arthur Harris leave little doubt about that.

Tedder, in the

course of a lecture at Cambridge on 18th February, 1947, stated:

"Our operations against the Germ1;1,n fleet showed up one

respect in which we had been wrong.

It had been thought that,

though the.bomber could not by its very nature be as fast as the

fighter, yet it could cope with the fighter provided it had sufficient

speed and effective defensive armament.

The heavy casualties

suffered by the raids off Kiel and Wilhelmshaven showed that this

was not the .case and from that time on till late in the war the

great bulk of our bomber operations over Germany were at night."
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Harris, less circumlocutory, on page 73 of "Bomber Of
fensive," states.
"The German defenses were so strong that it was impossible
to operate regularly or with any sizeable force by day, so that all
our main operations were confined to the hours of darkness."
On page 80:
"Our attacks on the German naval units during the phoney
war had shown that we could not operate by day over Germany

without completely prohibitive casualties for day fighters and we
at once began to ppepare and train for bo:qibing at night."
Moreover, on page 39 he demolishes the implication by
Tedder that reasonable care had been devoted to ensuring that our
bombers were adequately fast and armed. He states:
"The Hampden was cold meat for any determined fighter in

daylight as I knew it would be and we got one or two pretty
serious knocks. The Hampden was then a most feebly armed
aircraft with a single gun on top and a single one underneath
manned by a gunner in a hopelessly cramped position, together
with a gun firing forward which, as it was fixed, was of no value
at all."

Wing Commander Guy Gibson, V. C., describes, in "Enemy
Coast Ahead," one of the serious knocks which Harris mentions.
He writes, on page 67 :

"When, however, these Hampden squadrons ;were given

their chance and did get to Norway in daylight it was pretty fierce
slaughter. Their orders were to fly in a very tight box so as to
bring as much defensive armament as possible to bear on oncoming
fighters, but the Germans were no fools ; they had found a weak
spot in the Hampdens, for at that time there was a blind area on
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either side and the Huns made the best of their knowledge_______ _

Their mode of attack was to fly in formation with the Hampdens

perhaps fifty yards out and slightly to the front, and pick off the

outside men with their one gun aiming with a no-deflection shot

at the pilot.

The bomber boys could do nothing about it; they

just had to sit there and wait to be shot down. If they broke away

they were immediately pounced on by three Messerschmitt 109's
waiting in the background.

If they stayed the pilot received a

machine-gun serenade in his face.

down from the wing man inwards.

One by one they were hacked
Watts said it was a terrible

sight to see them burst into flames at about twenty feet, then

cartwheel one wing into the cold sea. First B Beer went; that was
poor old Peter.

Who was next? There was H Harry on the out

side. The German gunner carefully took aim, then a few minutes
later H Harry disappeared beneath the flaming waves.
poor old Charles.

That was

One pilot made the hopeless gesture of pulling

back his hood and firing his revolver at the enemy gunner, but it
.

)

was no good and his brave act was the last thing he did on this

earth.

At last low cloud was reached and four out of the twelve

managed to scrape home."

This kind of slaughter was not peculiar to the Hampdens.

Wing Commander Asher Lee, in his book "The German Air Force,"

describes the fate of theBattle and Blenheim squadrons in 1940. He
writes on page 55 :

"The same relative impotence characterized the daylight

attacks by British Blenheims and Battles on German troops and
communications in the battle area.

Flying mostly without escort

and in small numbers, they were engaged in operations which
were at best hazardous and in the main suicidal."

By the time that it had been decided to resort to night
bombing as the panacea against slaughter, the bomber force had
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